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Income polarization in European 
countries and Europe wide, 2004–2012
Jinxian Wang, Koen Caminada, Kees Goudswaard and Chen Wang*
Polarization is an interesting additional social indicator for analyzing income dis-
tribution across countries, as it captures the phenomenon of ‘clustering around 
extreme poles’. Income polarization can be closely linked to social exclusion, which 
is relevant for EU social policy, because combatting social exclusion is a central 
element of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 Strategy. Rising income polari-
zation has been observed outside Europe, but within the EU, polarization is rela-
tively unexplored. This paper provides theoretical insights into this relatively new 
dimension of income distribution and analyzes trends in income polarization in 
28 EU countries and 3 non-EU countries, using micro-data from EU-SILC over 
the period 2004–2012. Income polarization is rather stable over this period in 
European countries, and Europe-wide. It was rising among the old EU15 countries 
in the sub-period 2004–2008, but declining afterwards. The opposite development 
is witnessed for New Member States. Despite the Great Recession we find quite 
stable income polarization in Europe.
Key words: Income polarization, Inequality, Poverty, EU-SILC
JEL classifications: H53, H55, I32
1. Introduction
Unlike inequality and poverty, which have received a great deal of attention in the lit-
erature, income polarization as a concept is relatively unexplored, especially in Europe. 
Income polarization and income inequality are both sensitive to the middle of the 
distribution but the two concepts are different. While income inequality concerns the 
distances of different individuals in a society from the population mean, income polari-
zation focuses on income differences and income clusters, comparing the homogeneity 
within a group with the overall heterogeneity of a given population (Castro, 2003). As 
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such, income polarization is closer to the notion of segregation than income inequality 
(Esteban and Ray, 1994). Income polarization is also different from poverty since the 
latter focuses mainly on what has happened at the lower end of the income distribution 
(Caminada et al., 2012).
Several authors argue that the relevant distributional phenomenon is not inequal-
ity, but polarization (Duclos et  al., 2004; Duro, 2005). Income polarization can be 
related to a shrinking middle class. A well-off middle class is important to every society 
since it is associated with high income, high economic growth and social and politi-
cal stability (Easterly, 2001; Pressman, 2007). In contrast, high income polarization 
may generate several harms. First of all, high income polarization may lead to the 
emergence of social unrest and tension (Esteban and Ray, 1994, 1999, 2011). Second, 
high income polarization means less social mobility. In a highly polarized society, indi-
viduals in each cluster feel closer to each other but distant from other groups, causing 
barriers for mobility between groups. Consequently, the relatively poor face difficulties 
in moving up the income ladder (Motiram and Sarma, 2014). This is an important 
aspect of social exclusion. Further, income polarization thwarts economic growth. One 
reason is that social conflict and political instability underlying income polarization 
increase pressure on market activities and labor relations and may reduce the secu-
rity of property rights (Keefer and Knack, 2002). Moreover, income polarization may 
harm health, since social tension and conflict create psychosocial stress. Also, income 
disparities increase disagreement between groups with conflictive interests on the pro-
vision of certain public goods, for instance health care, which may result in reduction 
of its provision and therefore affect health (Pérez and Ramos, 2010). Hence, in order 
to minimize such risks, it is necessary to monitor economic development in a society 
using indicators to depict to what degree the income distribution is divided into poles 
(Clementi et al., 2015).
However, the (empirical) analysis of income polarization is relatively new in Europe, 
compared to countries outside Europe, for instance China (Wang and Wan, 2015; 
Zhang and Kanbur, 2001), India (Chakravarty and Majumder, 2001; Motiram and 
Sarma, 2014), Nigeria (Clementi et  al., 2015), Latin American countries (Deutsch 
et  al., 2014; Gasparini et  al., 2008) and more developed countries like the United 
States and Canada (D’Ambrosio and Wolff, 2001; Foster and Wolfson, 1992, 
2010). In Europe, literature on income polarization has involved only single coun-
tries like Denmark (Hussain, 2009), Germany (Gigliarano and Mosler, 2009), Italy 
(D’Ambrosio, 2001; Poggi and Silber, 2010) and Spain (Gradín, 2000) or a limited 
number of European countries (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013; Brzezinski, 2013; 
Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio, 2010; Esteban et al., 2007; Seshanna and Decornez, 
2003). This lack of attention in Europe is remarkable, since income polarization is 
closely related to social exclusion. Since 2000, combatting economic and social exclu-
sion has been one of the central objectives of the European Union (EU) strategy both 
between and within member states (European Council, 2000). In this context, it is 
important to analyze income polarization in Europe more extensively.
Therefore, we first contribute to the existing studies to track the trends in income 
polarization in 31 European countries over the period of 2004–2012, including the 15 
old EU countries, 13 New Member States (NMS) and three other European coun-
tries, namely Iceland, Norway and Switzerland. There are sizeable income differences 
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2007. Hence, it is particularly interesting to see how the NMS compare to the well-
established welfare states of the old EU15 member states.
While analyses of income distribution are often based on a national perspective, 
there are good reasons to look at Europe as a whole (Fredriksen, 2012). When it comes 
to options and pitfalls for social policy initiatives at the EU level to increase social 
cohesion, EU-wide income differences are as important as national income differences 
(e.g. Goedemé and Van Lancker, 2009; Levy et al., 2013). Recently, EU-wide social 
indicators on income inequality and poverty have been analyzed (e.g. Fredriksen, 
2012; Goedemé et al., 2014). These EU-wide indicators can provide basic information 
in evaluating the process of the Union towards greater social cohesion (Brandolini, 
2007). To the best of our knowledge, there is no study addressing income polarization 
considering Europe as a whole. Therefore, the second contribution of this study is to 
analyze the level of income polarization by taking the European countries as a sin-
gle country, thus adding another perspective to the comparative research on income 
distribution.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of the 
income polarization indicator and its difference with income inequality measures. 
Section 3 describes our data (EU-SILC). The subsequent section contains empirical 
analyses on both the level and change of income polarization in 31 European countries 
and Europe-wide, for the period 2004–2012. Also, the empirical relationship between 
income polarization and other social indicators is discussed. The last section concludes.
2. Characteristics of the polarization indicator
2.1 The income polarization indicator
Polarization means different things to different people. So far economists usually focus 
on income polarization, which refers to the clustering of income groups (Gornick 
and Jäntti, 2013). To measure income polarization, several indicators have been put 
forward. These indicators can be generally classified into two families: bipolarization 
and multi-peaked income polarization. Bipolarization and multi-peaked polarization 
indicators are univariate and satisfy some basic axioms: (1) there is little polarization 
when only one group exists; (2) polarization increases when inter-group inequality 
increases; (3) polarization increases when intra-group inequality decreases. Besides 
income polarization, there are several other types of polarization which can be ana-
lyzed distinctively (Duclos and Taptué, 2015). For instance, job polarization (the dis-
appearance of middle-class jobs) or health polarization have been analyzed by several 
scholars (e.g. Goos et al., 2009; Pérez and Ramos, 2010). Social polarization describes 
cases in which variables of interest are qualitative or noncardinal (for instance ethnic 
polarization; see Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). In 2010, Apouey constructed 
a bivariate polarization indicator, which accounts for both income and health condi-
tions in a distribution. Apouey’s (2010) polarization indicator can be classified into the 
family of socioeconomic polarization indicators (Duclos and Taptué, 2015). Finally, 
Anderson (2010) and Gigliarano and Mosler (2009) develop a family of multivariate 
polarization indicators, which generalize income and socioeconomic polarization. In 
this study, we focus on the income polarization indicators only. We are interested in how 
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Specifically, bipolarization describes the distances between two income groups. 
Usually the two groups are located at either side of the median. That is, bipolarization 
captures the process in which the middle class disappears while clusters move to the 
two opposite poles. Literature on the measurement of bipolarization can be traced 
back to Foster and Wolfson (1992, 2010).1 More recently, various bipolarization indi-
cators have been proposed by other scholars, including Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio 
(2010), Chakravarty and Majumder (2001), Lasso de la Vega et al. (2010), Rodriguez 
and Salas (2003), Silber et al. (2007) and Wang and Tsui (2000).
Multi-peaked polarization indicators, on the other hand, attempt to capture the 
existence and importance of income groups clustering around any arbitrary number 
of groups. Leading studies include D’Ambrosio (2001), Duclos et al. (2004), Esteban 
and Ray (1994), Esteban et al. (1999, 2007) and Poggi and Silber (2010). Because 
multi-peaked polarization can deal with the existence of multiple groups, the concept 
is more flexible (Duclos and Taptué, 2015). For this reason, this study applies a multi-
peaked income polarization indicator. The bipolarization index will not be used in our 
empirical analysis because it restricts its scope to the existence of two poles. Also, the 
split of data sample is arbitrarily set at the median income when computing bipolariza-
tion (Esteban and Ray, 2005). On the contrary, the DER index lets data determine the 
number of poles and the splits. However, the indicator of bipolarization ( FW ) and the 
indicator of multi-peaked polarization ( DER ) are strongly correlated. The correlation 
between the two indicators in our empirical analysis reaches 0.97.
Formalization of multi-peaked polarization indicators can rely on an ‘identification-
alienation’ framework, first derived by Esteban and Ray (1994). The ‘identification-
alienation’ framework states that in societies, income groups are likely to have different 
preferences for redistribution when they are far apart from each other. Such distances 
will bring about a feeling of alienation, which may lead to a lack of understanding 
of and tolerance for other income groups, therefore giving rise to societal tension. 
Meanwhile, as income groups are internally more homogeneous, their members have 
stronger feelings of belonging to their groups and identify more closely to others within 
the same group, which in turn may also increase social tension (Pérez and Ramos, 
2010). According to Pérez and Ramos (2010), it is inequality between relevant popu-
lation subgroups, i.e. alienation, rather than simply overall population inequality, that 
would increase differences in preferences for redistribution and lead to disagreement 
and conflict. Similarly, the more identity the members feel to their income groups, the 
more likely societal tension would arise.
Suppose the original distribution consists of n groups and pi denotes the population 
share of group i (i = 1, 2, …, n). µ i denotes the average income of group i. Esteban and 
Ray’s (1994) ( ER ) indicator is expressed as:







i j i j
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1 The bipolarization indicator proposed by Foster and Wolfson (1992, 2010) can be expressed 
as ,FW G G
m
B W= −( ) µ where GB , GW , µ  and m  are within-group inequality, between group inequality, 
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where K  and α  are constants with K > 0  and α ∈[ , . ]0 1 6 .2 The selected sensitivity 
parameter α  is chosen by the investigator and depicts the cohesion within a group. 
The higher α  is, the characteristics of the members within groups are more similar 
and the groups are more homogeneous. When α  equals 0, the ER  indicator becomes 
the Gini coefficient. The higher α  is, the more different the ER  indicator is from the 
Gini coefficient.
The ER  indicator is based on a discrete, finite set of income groups. This generates 
two shortcomings. First, a discrete, finite number of points suffers from a conceptual 
limitation of discontinuity. Second, the investigator needs to decide how many groups 
the population would be divided into. Practical difficulty thus arises when the popula-
tion in one group could also be regarded as population in other groups (Duclos et al., 
2004). To overcome the two shortcomings, Duclos et al. (2004) extend the polarization 
indicator for continuous distributions:











Income vi  is ordered such that v v v1 2≤ ≤ ≤ . The constant α  reflects the strength 
of identity within a group. The higher α  is, the stronger homogeneity the individuals 
feel to others within the same group. The DER  indicator becomes the Gini coefficient 
when α  = 0. Duclos et al. (2004) impose additional axioms on the polarization meas-
ure. To meet these axioms, α  must be bounded: α ∈ [0.25, 1]. Taking into account 
the relationship between DER  and Gini, we may expect that low values for α  should 
produce values of the DER  indices that are close in practice to the values of Gini, 
while values for α  close to 1 lead potentially to the highest disparity between Gini and 
the DER  indices.
2.2 The relationship between income polarization and income inequality
The income polarization index lies, as the Gini coefficient, between 0 and 1. Income 
polarization and Gini equal 0 for a perfectly equal distribution of incomes. When 
income polarization (Gini) increases, the society becomes more polarized (unequal). 
However, income polarization is different from inequality. Inequality concerns the dis-
tances of different individuals in a society from the population mean. Income polariza-
tion, on the other hand, is closer to the notion of segregation than income inequality 
(Esteban and Ray, 1994). Income polarization places both emphasis on income differ-
ences and income clusters, comparing the homogeneity within a group with the over-
all heterogeneity of a given population (Castro, 2003). As such, income polarization 
depicts the extent of similarity among members in a group and the distances between 
groups.3
In practice, income polarization and income inequality may not go hand in hand. 
With two or more groups, income polarization increases when inter-group income 
2 The α  is bounded [0, 1.6] to satisfy the axioms imposed on the ER  and other intuitive properties of 
the measure (Esteban and Ray, 1994).
3 The main differences between the three notions of inequality, bipolarization and polarization are also 
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inequality increases or when intra-group income inequality decreases. The latter case 
can best depict the difference between income polarization and all standard inequality 
indicators (Brezezinski, 2013). Both inequality and income polarization will decline 
if there is an ‘equalizing transfer’ of income from an individual above the median to 
an individual with income below the median. However, inequality and income polari-
zation might diverge when there are equalizing transfers entirely on one side of the 
median (Wolfson, 1994, 1997). The difference between inequality and income polari-
zation can be described by a hypothetical example where one individual owns the total 
income and all others none. In this case, inequality reaches the upper bound but the 
society is hardly polarized.
Income polarization and income inequality can even move in opposite directions; 
see Table 1 (see also Atkinson and Brandolini, 2013). Assume that the multiple-peaked 
distribution evolved from the uniform distribution; some middle incomes have dis-
appeared, while both low- and high-income groups grew. Total income of the whole 
population has remained the same. Note that the multi-peaked distribution is more 
polarized than the uniform distribution. However, the more polarized multi-peaked 
distribution is also more equal (the Lorenz curve of the multi-peaked distribution lies 
closer to the egalitarian than the Lorenz curve of the uniform distribution). As a result, 
the Gini coefficient of the multi-peaked distribution is lower than the Gini of the uni-
form distribution. The same holds for the s80/s20 ratio. In this example, higher income 
polarization is accompanied by lower income inequality. Overall, income inequality 
and income polarization are two different concepts that should be examined sepa-
rately when analyzing income distributions (Ezcurra, 2009). Phenomena such as ‘the 
disappearing middle class’ or ‘clustering around extremes’ do not appear to be easily 
captured by standard measures of inequality such as the Gini coefficient.
But would conclusions drawn from comparisons of inequality measures (Gini and 
poverty rates) be reversed or significantly changed if we use polarization measures 
in comparing societies over time? Empirical evidence is mixed. Ravallion and Chen 
(1997) and Zhang and Kanbur (2001) find that the polarization indicators do not 
Table 1. A numerical example on the relationship between polarization and Gini
Uniform distribution Multi-peaked distribution
# households income # households income
3 25 1 25
3 50 7 50
3 75 1 75
3 100 3 100
3 12 1 125
3 150 7 150
3 175 1 175
21 2,100 21 2,100
Gini coefficient 0.29 0.26
Ratio S80/S20 5.40 3.57







niversiteit Leiden / LU
M
C
 user on 03 April 2019
Income Polarization in Europe  803
generate very different results from the inequality measures such as the Gini. Brzezinski 
(2013) and Lasso de la Vega and Urrutia (2006), on the other hand, provide evidence 
that inequality and polarization indices differ empirically and in significant ways. For 
example, based on micro data for more than 70 countries over the period of 1960–
2005, Brzezinski (2013) suggests that using a standard inequality indicator like the 
Gini leads to misleading conclusions when analyzing the impact of income distribution 
on economic growth, while there is a good indication that income polarization is nega-
tively associated with economic growth in the short term. Overall, the issue of whether 
income polarization and inequality (poverty rates) can be distinguished empirically has 
been a matter of some debate.
3. Data
The European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) is the 
EU reference source for micro income data. EU-SILC provides an up-to-date source 
for comparative research on income and living conditions in the EU. This dataset 
contains internationally and cross-temporarily comparable variables for all EU mem-
ber states and some other countries. EU-SILC is unique since it offers information 
on a range of social indicators. Many EU indicators designed to monitor poverty, 
income inequality and social inclusion in the EU are based on EU-SILC (European 
Commission, 2006). At the EU level, EU-SILC has become a standard source for 
social reporting (Lohmann, 2011). Since we are interested in how income polarization 
has developed across European countries and Europe-wide, data from EU-SILC are 
suitable, as they cover all European countries and over a long period. For the empirical 
analyses presented in this paper, EU-SILC 2004–2012 data are taken for 31 countries, 
namely all 28 EU member states plus three non-EU countries: Iceland, Norway and 
Switzerland.
EU-SILC contains detailed information on individual and household characteris-
tics as well as income by source. All income information of EU-SILC refers to the 
‘income reference period’. Except for Ireland and the UK, in all countries the income 
reference period covers the 12 months of the calendar year prior to the survey year. In 
Ireland, the income reference period is the last 12 months prior to the interview. In the 
UK, current weekly or monthly income is annualized and the income reference period 
refers to the year of the survey (Eurostat, 2008). It should be noted that there are con-
siderable differences between participating countries in EU-SILC in terms of sample 
design, sample frame and data source (Goedemé, 2013). Furthermore, the data col-
lection approach varies over time. For instance, prior to 2007, some of the countries 
provided no information on gross incomes (France, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, 
Spain). Data from these countries are not used in years when only net income informa-
tion is available. Moreover, the analysis of trends of income polarization is restricted to 
20 European countries due to data availability.
In this paper, we track the trends in income polarization of household disposable 
income across European countries over the period 2004–2012. We further split the 
period into two, using 2008 as the mid-point to investigate effects before and since the 
Great Recession. We compute the level of income polarization for household dispos-
able income, equivalized using the square-root scale. Disposable income is defined 
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insurance contributions. Following common practice (see e.g. Lohmann, 2011), we 
exclude non-positive incomes. In line with Eurostat practice, no top-coding of income 
has been applied. All incomes are converted into euros of 2005 (deflating by a country-
specific consumer price index taken from World Bank, 2012). Available countries and 
data years are presented in Table 2.
To calculate income polarization across countries and over time, we use the DER , 
which can overcome the limitation of other polarization indicators (e.g. ER and WF 
indicators). The DER  indicator has been widely used (e.g. Hussain, 2009; Wang and 
Wan, 2015). Following their common practice, the value of α  = 0.5 is chosen. In the 
sensitivity analysis, we compute the DER  indicator for a range of values of α .
4. Empirical analysis
4.1 Levels and trends in income polarization across European countries
Table  3 shows estimates for the income polarization indicator (DER, α  =  0.5) for 
European countries and the direction of movement in the indicator in the two sub-
periods 2004–2008 and 2008–2012.
Relatively low levels of income polarization for 2012 are mainly found in Norway, 
Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden while relatively high income polarization levels are 
observed in countries like Bulgaria, Cyprus, Portugal and Latvia. We computed the 
polarization measure DER for a range of values of α across countries for 2012, but 
Table 2. Available countries and data years in EU-SILC
Old EU-15 NMS-13
AT Austria 2004–2012 BG Bulgaria 2007–2012
BE Belgium 2004–2012 CY Cyprus 2005–2012
DE Germany 2005–2012 CZ Czech Republic 2005–2012
DK Denmark 2004–2012 EE Estonia 2004–2012
ES Spain 2004–2012 HR Croatia 2011–2012
FI Finland 2004–2012 HU Hungary 2005–2012
FR France 2004–2012 LT Lithuania 2005–2012
GR Greece 2004–2012 LV Latvia 2007–2012
IE Ireland 2004–2012 MT Malta 2008–2012
IT Italy 2004–2012 PL Poland 2005–2012
LU Luxembourg 2004–2012 RO Romania 2007–2012
NL Netherlands 2005–2012 SI Slovenia 2005–2012
PT Portugal 2004–2012 SK Slovakia 2005–2012
SE Sweden 2004–2012




Note: No time-series analyses for countries presented in italic due to lack of quality of data (no gross 
incomes) for ES (2004–2005), FR (2004–2006), GR (2004–2006), IT (2004–2006), LV (2005–2006), PT 
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Country Available in 
EU-SILC







AT Austria 2004–2012 0.183 0.188 0.191 2.8% 1.6% 4.5%
BE Belgium 2004–2012 0.188 0.194 0.188 3.1% –3.0% 0.0%
DE Germany 2005–2012 0.191 0.193 0.189 1.4% –2.1% –0.8%
DK Denmark 2004–2012 0.166 0.191 0.170 15.4% –10.8% 3.0%
ES Spain 2006–2012 0.202 0.209
FI Finland 2004–2012 0.187 0.189 0.189 1.0% 0.3% 1.3%
FR France 2007–2012 0.204 0.204
GR Greece 2007–2012 0.212 0.204
IE Ireland 2004–2012 0.216 0.215 0.204 –0.5% –4.9% –5.4%
IT Italy 2007–2012 0.200 0.207
LU Luxembourg 2004–2012 0.189 0.212 0.194 11.9% –8.2% 2.7%
NL Netherlands 2005–2012 0.172 0.181 0.175 5.4% –3.4% 1.8%
PT Portugal 2007–2012 0.228 0.216
SE Sweden 2004–2012 0.164 0.169 0.174 3.0% 3.4% 6.5%
UK United Kingdom 2005–2012 0.223 0.217 0.208 –2.8% –4.2% –6.8%
Mean-10 0.188 0.195 0.188 3.8% –3.3% 0.3%
Coefficient of variation 0.098 0.075 0.062 –24% –17% –37%
NMS-13
BG Bulgaria 2007–2012 0.226 0.213
CY Cyprus 2005–2012 0.199 0.200 0.214 0.6% 6.8% 7.5%
CZ Czech Republic 2005–2012 0.186 0.178 0.177 –4.2% –0.4% –4.6%
EE Estonia 2004–2012 0.220 0.200 0.204 –9.1% 2.1% –7.2%
HR Croatia 2011–2012 0.205
HU Hungary 2005–2012 0.188 0.182 0.187 –3.0% 2.7% –0.3%
LT Lithuania 2005–2012 0.219 0.214 0.206 –2.5% –3.8% –6.1%
LV Latvia 2005–2012 0.239 0.221
MT Malta 2008–2012 0.199 0.197
PL Poland 2005–2012 0.217 0.203 0.199 –6.7% –1.8% –8.3%
RO Romania 2007–2012 0.220 0.207
SI Slovenia 2005–2012 0.172 0.171 0.173 –0.4% 1.1% 0.6%
SK Slovakia 2005–2012 0.186 0.177 0.180 –4.6% 1.9% –2.8%
Mean-8 0.198 0.191 0.193 –3.9% 1.0% –2.9%
Coefficient of variation 0.087 0.075 0.073 –14% –3% –16%
Other
CH Switzerland 2008–2012 0.205 0.195
IS Iceland 2004–2012 0.177 0.191 0.175 7.8% –8.3% –1.2%
NO Norway 2004–2012 0.188 0.173 0.165 –7.9% –5.0% –12.6%
Mean-20 0.191 0.192 0.188 0.2% –1.9% –1.7%
Coefficient of variation 0.094 0.076 0.074 –20% –3% –22%
Note: No data for ES (2004–2005), FR (2004–2006), GR (2004–2006), IT (2004–2006), PT (2004–
2006), BG (2004–2006), HR (2004–2010), LV (2005–2006), MT (2004–2007), RO (2004–2006), and 
CH (2004–2007). Both Mean-10 Old EU15 countries and Mean-8 NMS only include countries for which 
all data years are available.
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country rankings seem to be independent of the value of α (see additional supporting 
information)
For our trend analysis, only 20 countries are included which have data starting from 
the year 2004 or 2005 to 2012. We further split the period into two, using 2008 as the 
mid-point to investigate effects before and since the Great Recession. The economic 
crisis has given rise to challenges to the welfare state and may have influenced income 
polarization in European countries.
Table 3 shows a rise of income polarization from 2004 to 2008 for seven out of 10 
old EU15 countries, but a decline afterwards (with the exception of three countries). 
For some countries, as Denmark and Luxembourg, a rather large increase of income 
polarization was followed by a rather large decrease since 2008. The opposite develop-
ment is witnessed for the NMS: a decline of income polarization from 2004 to 2008 
for seven out of eight NMS, but a slight increase afterwards (with the exception of 
three countries). So the pattern for the old EU15 countries differs from the NMS. 
However, differences between countries became smaller over time, especially between 
2004 and 2008. The coefficient of variation declined from 0.094 to 0.074 in the period 
2004–2012 across the 20 countries (–22%), indicating convergence of income polari-
zation outcomes. The convergence between the NMS mainly occurred in the period 
2004–2008.
Despite the Great Recession, and despite cross-country differences of both levels 
and changes in income polarization, Table 3 shows a rather stable income polarization 
in European countries. It appears that income shocks of the crisis were distributed 
equally over different groups in these countries.
Results are robust regarding the trends in income polarization (DER) by using dif-
ferent values of α (see Figure 1). We find pretty good fits with respect to the correlation 
between changes in the DER (α = 0), DER (α = 0.25), DER (α = 0.75) and changes in 
the DER (α = 0.5) for the period 2004–2012. The correlation between changes in the 
DER (α = 1) and changes in the DER (α = 0.5) is somewhat weaker.
4.2 EU-wide income polarization
For EU policymakers and researchers, there are good reasons to look not only at 
national income dynamics but also at EU-wide dynamics in the distribution of incomes 
to grasp trends in social cohesion in the EU and to identify options and pitfalls for 
social policy initiatives at the EU level (Goedemé et al., 2014). EU-wide policies and 
objectives are already in place in a number of fields. In 2000 the European Council set 
the goal that besides economic growth social cohesion should be strengthened in the 
EU (the Lisbon Agenda, European Council, 2000). On 17 June 2010, the European 
Council agreed to define inclusive growth as one of the priorities for the EU and to 
reduce the number of Europeans at risk of poverty or social exclusion by at least 20 
million by 2020. As such, the Europe 2020 Strategy aims to improve social inclusion 
in Europe and to reduce regional income disparities. Concerns for social cohesion 
in the Union now appear to be gaining momentum. Finally, with deeper integration, 
individuals in Europe are more likely to look beyond their national borders when they 
make relative income comparisons (Fredriksen, 2012). However, until now the pic-
ture of the Union emerges mainly by aggregation of the national evidence, and little 
attempt is made to directly estimate EU-wide values: these are typically computed as 
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2006). According to Fredriksen (2012), if indicators on income dispersion are calcu-
lated as the weighted mean of national values, between-state income differences in the 
EU are excluded. So far, EU-wide social indicators on income inequality and poverty 
have been discussed, but not indicators on income polarization. Inspired by, among 
others, Brandolini (2007), Fredriksen (2012) and Goedemé et al. (2014), this paper 
computes an aggregate EU-wide income polarization indicator that takes into account 
both within and between national income dispersion.
To start with, instead of calculating kernel densities and income polarization for each 
country individually, this section groups countries together and shows the income dis-
tribution Europe-wide, for the old EU15 countries and for the NMS. Kernel density 
Fig. 1. Correlation between changes in the polarization indicator with different  
values of α, 2004–2012.
Note: Simple OLS regression; t-values between brackets.
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estimation gives us an impression of the probability density of the equivalized dispos-
able income in our sample. We are able to cover 20 countries for this analysis. When 
calculating kernel densities and income polarization Europe-wide, it is necessary to 
make incomes comparable across countries in terms of purchasing power. Incomes are 
adjusted to take account of price-level differences between countries, using purchas-
ing power standard estimates taken from Eurostat (2015). The use of PPPs is not a 
perfect solution for making incomes cross-nationally comparable. For instance, they 
do not easily allow for a consistent comparison over time, as PPPs are (by necessity) 
constructed for a certain moment in time (Goedemé et al., 2014). Hence, when com-
paring incomes both cross-nationally and cross-temporally, we also have to take into 
account the differences in price levels (both over time and between countries). All 
incomes are therefore converted into euros of 2005 using country-specific consumer 
price indexes taken from the World Bank (2012) and purchasing power standards from 
Eurostat (2015, EU28 = 1).
The graphs in Figure  2 below could be interpreted as the population-weighted 
income distributions of the countries belonging to the respective groups (old EU15 
countries, NMS or Europe-wide, in line with the work of Bönke and Schröder, 2015).4 
Within our grouped old EU15 countries, a single pole in the distribution is found 
around 15 thousand equivalized disposable income, while this peak is much lower in 
the NMS (around 5 to 7 thousand euro); see Figure 2. While there is only one single 
pole in the distribution in the old EU15 countries, small multiple poles seem to be 

























































Fig. 2. Kernel densities of disposable equivalized income Europe-wide, 2005–2012.
Note: Old EU15 (10): Austria, Belgium, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK.
 NMS-13 (8): Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovenia and Slovakia.
 Non-EU countries (2): Iceland and Norway.
Source: Own calculations EU-SILC.
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around 5 to 7 thousand and around 17 thousand euro), generating higher polarization 
in this latter group of countries compared to the old EU15 group. Multiple peaks are 
also present in our EU-wide distribution covering 20 countries in our sample, with 
peaks between around 5 to 7 and 18 thousand euro. Adding both Norway and Iceland 
does not alter the picture much.
The level of income polarization in the old EU15 countries is rather low compared 
to the NMS, as can be seen from the summary statistics for income polarization; see 
Figure 3 (see also Table 5). Figure 3 confirms a stable income polarization in the old 
EU15 countries and the 20 European countries as a whole. The polarization indicator 
declined significantly within our grouped NMS in the period 2005–2012.
Similar to the indicators on poverty and inequality, the level and evolution of income 
polarization measured for the EU as if it was a single country can be regarded as basic 
information in evaluating the progress of the Union towards greater social cohesion. It 
is, however, important to be clear about the meaning and implications of such EU-wide 
measures. As Brandolini (2007) has suggested, the expansion of the EU population in 
the mid-2000s to include a considerable number of households with much lower real 
incomes has led to a fall of the EU median income. This is a warning against using a 
country average as a proxy for an EU-wide indicator whenever real income differences 
are large.
Table 4 presents the results of the income polarization indicator (DER, α = 0.5) by 
taking the EU countries as a whole and by calculating the simple averages of national 
values. The results show that the level of income polarization for the EU as a whole 
is higher than the simple average of national values, since the latter method does not 
take into account the between-country component of European income dispersion.5 
Further, income polarization is lower in the old EU15 countries as a whole than that 
in the NMS group. Over the period 2005–2012, income polarization remains stable in 
the old EU15 countries and the 20 European countries while it declined significantly 
Fig. 3. Trend polarization indicator EU-wide, 2005–2012.
Source: Own calculations EU-SILC.
5 Additional analysis shows that also the Gini coefficient for Europe as a whole is higher than the Gini 
calculated as a simple average of national Gini indexes. Also, if we measure at-risk-of-poverty rates with a 







niversiteit Leiden / LU
M
C
 user on 03 April 2019
810  J. Wang et al.
in the group of NMS. This is confirmed by simple linear regression analyses, also 
reported in Table 4.
4.3 Discussion on income polarization and other social indicators
The results for the polarization index can be compared with the more familiar inequal-
ity measures. But the EU has developed the indicator of people at risk of poverty or 
social exclusion to monitor the improvements with respect to social cohesion, which 
has been one of the EU objectives since 2000 (the Lisbon Agenda). The indicator of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion corresponds to the sum of persons who are 
at risk of poverty or severely materially deprived or living in households with very low 
work intensity. One could argue that this indicator and the polarization index measure 
different aspects of social exclusion. While the at-risk-of-poverty or social-exclusion 
indicator is focused on the deprived in general, the polarization index gives informa-
tion on the distance between groups.
Table 5 depicts the point estimates around 2012 for several social indicators: the 
income polarization indicator (DER, α = 0.5), the Gini coefficient, the poverty rate 
(threshold 60 percent of the median income for each country) and the indicator of 
people at risk of poverty or social exclusion. Countries are ranked in order of their level 
of the income polarization indicator from smallest (Norway) to highest (Latvia). Using 
different indicators, we may get different rankings of the distributions. For example, 
Norway ranks low for both the income polarization indicator and the other social 
indicators. Denmark, however, ranks low based on the polarization indicator, but rela-
tively high based on the Gini. In addition, we do not find strong correlation between 
changes in income polarization and changes in Gini coefficient, changes in at-risk-of-
poverty rates or people at risk of poverty or social exclusion (see Figure 4). There are 
some countries where income polarization and other social indicators present opposite 
trends between around 2004 and 2012. Overall, income polarization, the Gini coef-
ficient, at-risk-of-poverty rates and social exclusion are empirically different from each 
other. We suggest that the indicator of income polarization can function as an interest-
ing additional social indicator for analyzing income distribution in Europe.




Change Level social 
indicator
Change
2005 2012 2005 2012
Polarization Indicator ( α = 0 5. )
Old EU15 (10) 0.197 0.198 0% 0.190 0.188 –1%
NMS-10 (8) 0.230 0.210 –8%** 0.197 0.193 –2%
Old EU + NMS (18) 0.219 0.212 –3%* 0.193 0.190 –1%**
European Countries (20) 0.219 0.212 –3%* 0.192 0.188 –2%**
Note: Simple OLS regression; ** significant at 0.01 level; * significant at 0.05 level.
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5. Conclusion
Vast literature relies on traditional social indicators such as the Gini coefficient and 
relative poverty rates to analyze national and cross-national differences in earnings 
and income inequality. Income polarization is another interesting indicator, which has 
drawn some attention in Asia and the USA, but hardly in Europe. This is remarkable 
since income polarization is closely linked to social exclusion, one of the important 
elements of the Lisbon Agenda and the Europe 2020 Strategy. This study provides 
theoretical and empirical insights into this relatively new dimension of the income 
Table 5. Income polarization (DER, α = 0.5) and other social indicators, 2012








Country Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank Level Rank
Norway (a) 0.165 (1) 0.225 (1) 0.100 (3) 0.137 (2)
Denmark 0.170 (2) 0.281 (14) 0.131 (5) 0.190 (10)
Slovenia* 0.173 (3) 0.237 (2) 0.135 (8) 0.196 (13)
Sweden 0.174 (4) 0.248 (4) 0.141 (11) 0.156 (5)
Netherlands 0.175 (5) 0.254 (7) 0.101 (4) 0.150 (3)
Iceland (a) 0.175 (6) 0.240 (3) 0.079 (1) 0.127 (1)
CzechRepublic* 0.177 (7) 0.249 (5) 0.096 (2) 0.154 (4)
Slovakia* 0.180 (8) 0.253 (6) 0.132 (7) 0.205 (14)
Hungary* 0.187 (9) 0.269 (10) 0.140 (9) 0.324 (25)
Belgium 0.188 (10) 0.265 (9) 0.153 (16) 0.216 (15)
Germany 0.189 (11) 0.283 (15) 0.161 (20) 0.196 (13)
Finland 0.189 (12) 0.259 (8) 0.132 (7) 0.172 (6)
Austria 0.191 (13) 0.276 (12) 0.144 (12) 0.185 (9)
Luxembourg 0.194 (14) 0.280 (13) 0.151 (15) 0.184 (8)
Switzerland (a) 0.195 (15) 0.288 (16) 0.159 (18) 0.175 (7)
Malta* 0.197 (16) 0.271 (11) 0.151 (15) 0.231 (16)
Poland* 0.199 (17) 0.309 (20) 0.171 (21) 0.267 (20)
France 0.204 (18) 0.305 (18) 0.141 (11) 0.191 (11)
Estonia* 0.204 (19) 0.325 (25) 0.175 (22) 0.234 (17)
Ireland 0.204 (20) 0.299 (17) 0.157 (17) 0.300 (24)
Greece 0.204 (21) 0.343 (28) 0.231 (31) 0.346 (28)
Croatia* 0.205 (22) 0.309 (20) 0.204 (27) 0.326 (27)
Lithuania* 0.206 (23) 0.320 (24) 0.186 (24) 0.325 (26)
Italy 0.207 (24) 0.319 (23) 0.194 (26) 0.299 (23)
Romania* 0.207 (25) 0.332 (26) 0.226 (30) 0.417 (30)
United Kingdom 0.208 (26) 0.313 (22) 0.160 (19) 0.241 (18)
Spain 0.209 (27) 0.350 (30) 0.208 (28) 0.272 (22)
Bulgaria* 0.213 (28) 0.336 (27) 0.212 (29) 0.493 (31)
Cyprus* 0.214 (29) 0.310 (21) 0.147 (13) 0.271 (21)
Portugal 0.216 (30) 0.345 (29) 0.179 (23) 0.253 (19)
Latvia* 0.221 (31) 0.357 (31) 0.192 (25) 0.362 (29)
Mean-31 0.195 0.292 0.158 0.245
Note: * = NMS (a)= Non-EU countries.
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Fig. 4. Correlation between changes in the polarization index and other indicators, 2004–2012. (A) 
Correlation between changes in the polarization index and changes in Gini coefficient (B) Correlation 
between changes in the polarization index and changes in poverty (C) Correlation between changes in 
the polarization index and changes in social exclusion
Note: Simple OLS regression; t-values between brackets.
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distribution. We rely on micro-data from EU-SILC. We first explore the development of 
income polarization in European countries over the period 2004–2012. Furthermore, 
we take Europe as a whole to track the changes in income polarization Europe-wide.
Our analysis suggests that income polarization is conceptually and empirically dis-
tinguishable from other inequality indicators. Income polarization compares the homo-
geneity within a group with the heterogeneity of the total population. More income 
polarization can be associated with a divided society and social exclusion, and may also 
harm economic growth. We show that there is considerable variation in the ranking of 
countries regarding income polarization and other popular social indicators like the 
Gini coefficient and at-risk-of-poverty rates. Moreover, income polarization and Gini 
coefficients may not go hand in hand: an increase in Gini does not necessarily relate 
to an increase in income polarization. Variation in income polarization between coun-
tries and over time may result from changes in income equality (alienation) between 
groups, but the effect can be reinforced or offset by identification within groups (e.g. 
Hussain, 2009). Overall, we suggest that income polarization adds new insights into 
income distribution in Europe and can be used as an additional useful tool in analyz-
ing social exclusion.
The empirical results indicate that, over the period 2004–2012, income polarization 
is rather stable in European countries, and Europe as a whole. Income polarization 
was rising among the old EU15 countries in the sub-period 2004–2008, but declining 
afterwards. The Great Recession can thus be associated with lower levels of income 
polarization. Apparently, the income shock of the crisis has been distributed quite 
evenly over different groups in these countries. However, the NMS witnessed an oppo-
site development. Also, in these countries, income polarization is much higher than in 
the old EU15 countries. Income polarization in Europe as a whole is higher than the 
simple average of national polarization indicators. Overall, income polarization shows 
a converging pattern over the decade, indicating convergence at lower levels of income 
polarization in European countries and Europe as a whole. In terms of combatting 
social exclusion, this seems to be a good sign.
Finally, this study does not examine which factors may contribute to the trends 
in income polarization across European countries. Existing studies suggest that the 
tax-benefit system is essential in reducing market income inequality (e.g. Wang et al., 
2012, 2014). We expect that the tax-benefit system may also play an important role 
in the development of income polarization. Future work will examine the impact of 
the tax-benefit system on changing income polarization in European countries and 
Europe-wide.
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